FOCUS
At the same time that USAID
eign citizens into direct contact with
the military through ship tours,
band performances and other public outreach.
These examples demonstrate
that the U.S. military understands
the value of having its personnel engage local populations directly to
show the “softer side” of American
military power and to cultivate positive attitudes toward military personnel. The public diplomacy value that accrues to the
military, and by extension to the U.S. and the American
people, is much more significant as a result of having this
people-to-people interaction.
With that model in mind, how can the Foreign Service
practice public diplomacy more effectively? Clearly, there
must be deep structural changes in the way foreign aid is
administered before we can go back to the USIA-era best
practices of focusing on “monuments” and “people on the
ground.” And that obviously will
not happen overnight. However,
we should begin devoting a certain
percentage of U.S. assistance to the
establishment of universities and libraries in the developing world.
Spending just 5 or 10 percent of our
current aid budget this way would
have a lasting impact on education
there — and on bilateral relations.
Second, public diplomacy prac-
titioners must have more autonomy in decision-making
and planning programs. As with development assistance,
PD has increasingly become a matter of administration
and contract management, rather than having Americans
do the work directly on the ground. Under USIA, programming was much more field-centered; it was understood that Washington supported overseas posts, not vice
versa. Now the reverse is increasingly the case. To
change this, more decision-making should devolve to the
and the Peace Corps were
changing their focus, USIA
began shutting down cultural
centers around the world.