FOCUS
The principal argument
was, they were convinced, the
“real” work of any embassy. The
State Department employees who
did administrative or consular work
were merely performing support
functions, as were the representatives of other agencies such as
USIA or the departments of Commerce and Defense.
No one ever publicly discussed
this hierarchy, but everyone sensed
it. In Washington, the physical separation of USIA from
State (in buildings on opposite sides of town) helped to
make this distinction even more apparent to the people
involved. USIA directors from Edward Murrow to Bruce
Gelb often felt their agency was not being given the respect it deserved.
Many USIA Foreign Service officers were, however,
perfectly happy with careers that gave them increasing
responsibility, and they did not regret the fact that they
had little chance to become an ambassador one day. This
was especially true of those who preferred cultural or educational jobs, because they believed very much in the
importance of that work. These FSOs were content to be
assigned to the cultural side of the USIA operation in increasingly large posts, or to be a public affairs officer at
almost any post. Even many USIA officers who preferred the information side of the work only aspired to
be assigned to information officer positions or as a public affairs officer in important or interesting posts.
Whatever their motivations, these officers had all
joined USIA because they wanted to perform public
service, they were fascinated by the challenges of cross-cultural understanding, and they were convinced that
they were doing useful work for their country and the
world. They were proud of what they were doing, even
though they were aware that some of their State Department colleagues tended not to appreciate its importance. As long as they continued to get periodic
promotions and advanced into increasingly responsible
USIA assignments, that was enough.
sponsibilities. Moreover, even
those State officers who were interested in what their colleagues
from other agencies did had their
hands full trying to excel at their
own jobs so they could be promoted. (The competitive environment for all Foreign Service
personnel was, and is, rather intense, because it is an up-or-out
system with a certain percentage
of each grade level being “selected out” each year.) So
the typical State Department officer was simply not interested in USIA work because it was not career-enhancing to understand it or do it.
When the idea arose in the 1990s to merge USIA into
State, the principal argument advanced in its favor was
that it would bring public diplomacy (what USIA did)
closer to policymaking (what State does). Although many
career officers at USIA were apprehensive — rightly, as
it turned out — that public diplomacy would be swallowed up in the much-larger State bureaucracy, some of
them were also attracted by the idea that the merger
might indeed make State officers more aware of the value
public diplomacy officers add to the process. Once it was
inside State instead of outside it, the PD function would
perhaps gain more respect and its practitioners would
have more input into policymaking. (Also, those USIA
officers who really did want to become ambassador some
day thought they might have a better chance as part of
State.)
But soon after the 1999 merger, it became apparent
that nearly all of these hopes would be disappointed. A
2008 survey of more than 200 former senior USIA officials, many of whom had worked at State after the consolidation, found that 79 percent rated the merger into
State as a “disaster,” and 91 percent said the merger did
not increase the role of public diplomacy professionals in
the policymaking process.
Some of the officers transferred to State from USIA
ended up in one of the six regional bureaus. The assistant
secretaries who headed those bureaus tended to regard
these new arrivals primarily as additional bodies to be
used wherever they were needed, often filling in as regular desk officers, just like other State Department personnel. Some did PD work, but it was rare that they were
consulted in policymaking sessions about the public
for merging the two agencies
was to bring public
diplomacy closer to
policymaking.
No Longer Separate, but Still Unequal
Because the career paths of USIA Foreign Service officers were quite separate and distinct from those of their
State Department counterparts, the latter had little direct exposure to the details of USIA programs and re-
