FOCUS
Before 2008, the U.S.
Teams, more than 130,000 troops,
and a parallel civilian-military
structure where neither the ambassador nor commanding general
leads, the organization chart for
Iraq is extremely complicated.
And before 2008, the government
had only limited interagency
strategic cooperation mechanisms
that it could use there.
Civilian and military experts
have worked together for several years on PRTs, but not
at a strategic level. The Multinational Force–Iraq and
Embassy Baghdad do coordinate at the more senior levels, but strategies and operations are typically designed at
the mid-level. Lieutenant colonels and majors needed to
work more closely with civilian counterparts on strategy
design and implementation.
For years, embassies have drafted mission strategic
plans describing strategic, management and performance
goals for each country. Different agencies write goal papers to identify their highest-priority goals, set forth how
the U.S. will advance these goals, and list performance
measures. But none of these plans motivated true interagency strategic planning; rather, they were a collection of
inputs from government agencies that had little contact
even though their work often overlapped.
Around the world, U.S. interagency cooperation on nationbuilding was minimal until then-Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice introduced “Transformational Diplomacy” in 2005. The Director of Foreign Assistance position at the State Department was created shortly
thereafter to ensure that U.S. foreign assistance is unified
and supports foreign policy and national security objectives. The F Bureau’s Operational Plan brought together
all aid flows into one document, but it did not bring all actors into one room for strategic or even operational planning.
National Security Presidential Directive 44, promulgated in 2005, authorized the State Department to establish an Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and
Stabilization to lead the interagency response to international crises. S/CRS developed interagency planning procedures; but three years after its creation, it still lacked
the resources, credibility and experience to apply the
model to real-world scenarios.
Then in May 2008, the State Department and USAID
introduced a Country Assistance
Strategy approach to unify all U.S.
assistance in support of host-country priorities and American foreign
policy goals. This program was piloted in 10 countries, and rolled out
worldwide in 2009 — with one glaring omission: Iraq. There, the U.S.
government did not formulate an
operational plan, did not coordinate
foreign assistance through F, and
did not apply the S/CRS model or develop an interagency
country assistance strategy. As a result, none of these new
approaches improved interagency planning in Iraq.
government had only
limited interagency strategic
cooperation mechanisms
that it could use in Iraq.
Establishing JIATF
In February 2008, the Defense Department’s Special
Investigator General for Iraq Reconstruction assessed
U.S. assistance as “characterized by a continuing and disabling lack of coordination among the government agencies, contractors and other organizations involved. As
much as any other factor, this lack of coordination — arising from weak integration — has kept the U.S. program
from achieving its objectives.” Only by improving collaboration could the United States move toward the “
jointness” necessary for successful operations.
An interagency staffing request, endorsed by the commanding general and chief of mission in April 2008, created the task force to synchronize the efforts of the
interagency community and military in Iraq. Within
weeks, the Deputies Committee of the National Security
Council approved the request, with a goal of full operations by August 2008. Even before that deadline, civilian
and military representatives were providing expertise on
counterinsurgency and stabilization operations, and reaching back to colleagues in Baghdad and Washington. JIATF
analyzed the problems, developed a course of action and
proposed strategies to be included in the Joint Campaign
Plan for approval by the commanding general and the ambassador.
The JCP for Iraq was the first interagency attempt to
define all priorities, objectives and approaches to be taken
by all U.S. agencies in Iraq, and represented the U.S. government’s holistic strategy for achieving foreign policy and
national security goals there. Approved by Amb. Crocker
and General Raymond Odierno in December 2008, the
JCP represented a landmark agreement on military and
