Within days of the
threats (labeled something else)
from those they knew had ordered
the Khartoum killings within days
of the dreadful event, perhaps even
before Cleo Noel and Curt Moore
had been laid to rest at Arlington
National Cemetery.
If Nixon and Kissinger thought
it essential to negotiate quietly with
Arafat for reasons related to
broader Middle East policy, they
might have saved lives in the process by doing so several
days earlier, instead of going on the air with macho posturing that can be said to have triggered the Khartoum
murders.
government documents declassified and released as long ago as
2006. The depressing conclusion
is that old news is no news, no matter how important in substance.
Perhaps that explains official confidence that publication of old secrets will make no waves.
Equally disheartening, Henry
Kissinger’s reputation as the
supreme master of foreign affairs
would probably suffer no damage even if the story I have
told were broadcast beyond the circle of the Journal’s
devoted readership.
Does anybody care, including those in our own Foreign Service community? I do. I am certain I would
not have chosen the career I did had I known what I
now know about the dishonesty and deceit in high
places — an awful truth I have stumbled upon only in
retirement. ■
Khartoum murders,
the CIA had been authorized
to pursue negotiations with
a trusted Arafat aide.
The United States must without question have a firm
policy, stated and on the record, regarding terrorism, as
well as the human and material resources for carrying out
that policy. But the incidents cited above make certain
lessons self-evident.
First, it is foolish, pointless and potentially dangerous
to trumpet policy at every turn. Secondly, we have no
right, moral or legal, to encourage other governments to
negotiate while we stand aloof on principle. Thirdly, diversionary tactics aimed at concealing our role in negotiations serve no real purpose and may skew policy on
other important issues.
Finally, we must rid ourselves of the notion that flexibility is weakness. It cannot be excluded that a particular situation will require negotiations, perhaps direct,
perhaps via a third party, in order to save lives, both
American and others.
The key requirement is to focus on vital interests
rather than policies in determining how to respond to
specific incidents. The interests of both parties to a negotiation can often be accommodated, whereas neither
policy set in cement nor ideological rigidity leaves room
or hope for compromise.
To the best of my knowledge, the evidence presented
above has received no previous mention in the mainstream media, at home or abroad, although it is based on
